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THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE
COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC
Stephen L. Elkin
INTRODUCTION

Constitutional theory should concern the theory of the political
constitution of good political regimes. In the first section of this
paper, I will attempt to put some flesh on this spare statement. This
will form the body of the paper. I shall then use these ideas to
develop briefly the idea of the public interest for a particular kind of
good regime, the commercial republic, to which, I will say, we
Americans aspire. The idea of a commercial republican regime and
its public interest will enable me to point out in what sense we are
failing to attend sufficiently to economic equality and to the political
place controllers of capital now have-and to consider some of the
consequences of our inattention. These arguments will comprise the
final sections of the paper. The over-all argument of the paper might
best be viewed as a contribution to the revival of constitutional theory
as an account of the actual workings of good and good enough
regimes; such an account can be found in the work of theorists such as
Ackerman, Sunstein, Lowi, and Hayek, as well as in the writings of
many of the scholars whose work fills this symposium.'
To understand the central concerns of a theory of political
constitution, it is useful to have as a contrast some common views of
the substance of constitutional thinking. One candidate-perhaps the
most obvious one-for the mantle of constitutional theory is the study
of constitutional law. It ought to be obvious that, however useful such
analysis might be of what the Supreme Court has done and ought to
do, it has little to say about what the first theorists of constitutional
government worried about, viz. how to limit governmental power so
that the propensity of rulers to act arbitrarily and at variance with the
deepest interests of the citizenry could be curbed. The closest
constitutional law comes to such matters is when it considers the
Court's glancing attentions to the frame of government that the
1. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We The People. Foundations (1991): Friedrich Hayek.
Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 Vols. (1973) [hereinafter Hayek. Law. Legislation
and Liberty]; Theodore J. Lowi. The End of Liberalism (1969); Cass R. Sunstein.
The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism, in A New Constitutionalism 174 (Stephen L.
Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1993).
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American Constitution calls for.
Much the same thing can be said about comparative law, the
comparative analysis of written constitutions and any other analysis
that looks at the decisions of courts or at the documents called
constitutions. In general, these efforts assume that there exists
already what it is the task of constitutional theory to help bring about,
viz. a regime of laws and of regular and predictable relations between
office holders and those who compose the government, as well as
between government officials and the citizenry. Such analysis thus
assumes that what courts say will have some effect, and in doing so
assumes that there is in being a working and reasonably attractive
constitution.
Insofar as constitutional theory is composed of these sorts of
analyses, it is for the most part empirically bereft and normatively
weak. Empirically bereft because it has little to say about how to
secure the institutions that are the assumptions behind court decisions
and the like. Normatively weak because there is far too little
discussion of whether the working constitution contemplated in the
written Constitution is one to which we ought to give our allegiance.
The normative problem is especially pressing for Americans because
those who wrote the Constitution believed that a majority of those
who would live under it were incapable of carrying the burden of
citizenship. In any event, what needs defending is not the piece of
paper itself, but the working constitution of the form of government it
is supposed to call into being. And to provide an adequate defense of
that requires, at the least, some knowledge of the alternatives, an
account of the standards to which each is to be held, and the
difficulties of sustaining the preferred form of rule. All of this is in
short supply in the kind of constitutional analysis I have mentioned.
The result is, among other things, that we do not really know whether
the kind of political regime most of us believe we are committed to-a
republic'-requires a high court with the kind of political prerogatives
that the Supreme Court has. We do know that other nations have
managed something much like popular, limited government-that is,
republican government-without such a court and without a written
constitution along the lines of ours.
Still, constitutional analysis as it has developed in the United States3
has one powerful advantage over other brands of political and social
inquiry. It is at least concerned with practice, even if its conception of
practice is too narrow empirically and normatively. In this, it is a good
deal more useful than its competitors if our concern is to help create
an attractive political order. This is especially true in comparison to
the kind of positivist social science that is the mainstay of
2. See infra Part II.
3. And elsewhere as well.
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contemporary political and social analysis. Whatever its other virtues,
such analysis is largely indifferent to what political actors need to do if
they wish to bring into being an attractive political way of life. If
possible, this social science has even less to say about the content of
such a political way of life-and the kind of division of labor that has
grown up between empirically minded social scientists and social and
political theorists cannot save the day. Much of the analysis by the
latter group is textual in form, trying to clarify what the greatest minds
have had to say about politics and society. But many of these minds
have concerned themselves with such complex matters as the relation
between the good life and politics, and the deepest purposes of human
beings. However fundamental such questions are, the answers offered
are not easily translated into the kind of practical thinking that those
who wish to secure good political ways of life require. Or when these
powerful minds have addressed questions of practice, they have done
so for a world that is in many ways unrecognizable to inhabitants of
the twenty-first century.' So again, much remains to be done for those
who wish to help bring about a more attractive political way of life.
Perhaps a trifle optimistically, we might say that inside the thin lawand parchment-obsessed thinking I have been describing is a fat
constitutional theory trying to get out. And this fatter theory, if it is to
be of any more use than the kind of analysis I have been considering,
needs to be at once empirical and normative, and must somehow
bridge the theory-practice divide. Where shall we start if we wish to
develop such a theory? By taking seriously the word "constitutional,"
and instead of thinking of it as pointing to nouns and adjectives-a
constitution; a constitutional act-to think of it as a verb-to
constitute. But to constitute what? The answer, I have suggested, is
good political regimes, and the theory should concern the creation and
maintenance of good political regimes. It will perhaps help here to

see that, if I am correct, constitutional theory is a branch of political
theory-in particular, given a concern with the American political
order, that branch of democratic theory concerned with the design of
a democratic political order.
I. INSTITUTIONS, VALUES AND REGIMES

While it might be accepted that constitutional theory ought to have
something like the form I have been pointing to, the meaning of the
term "regime" needs some explanation, since helping to secure good
regimes, I have said, is the task of constitutional theory. This can best
be done by considering the relation between institutions and values.

4. Consider here Plato on the one hand and Locke on the other.
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A. Values and Institutions
The most common form contemporary discussion takes concerning
the relation between political-moral value and political institutions is
to be found in a certain style of political and moral philosophy. In
such discussions it is thought to be enough to spell out the meaning of,
and the justification of, a particular value or set of values. The
implication is that the question of the design of political institutions to
serve these values can be taken up later, and probably by someone
else. Values and institutional form are two separate matters, it is
suggested, and as such can be treated through a division of labor. The
underlying idea in this sort of work is that political institutions are
means to achieve valued ends, and we should settle the latter firstfor example, by giving an account of distributive justice, individual
autonomy or some other desirable end or ends.
Consider here the remarks of Philippe van Parijs who describes his
effort as one "of trying to find an optimal fit between a consistent set
of principles and one's considered judgments."5 Unless consistency
here means that a crucial part of one's "considered judgments" must
concern how various political-economic institutions can plausibly be
made to work-which is not, in fact, a central concern of the bookthe implication is that the question of whether there are institutions
that can effectively give life to the principles can be put aside until
later. In this context, it is important to note that talking about a
policy-for example, one that will provide a guaranteed income to all,
which is van Parijs' major concern-is not sufficient. Without an
attendant account of whether political institutions can work in the
necessary ways-including whether there can be consistent political
support for their workings-talking about policy doesn't add much to
the discussion. It is akin to saying in a different language that giving
people income is a good way to serve equality. That tells us
something, but it is far from settling the question whether this
conception of equality is a good thing. We don't know which
institutional arrangements are necessary to give it life and then to
maintain it.
Similarly, it is commonly observed, in defending an account of
justice against the charge that it is too indeterminate to be of much
use, that this is "more of a practical than a theoretical objection."'
Again, the implication is that the question of whether it is possible to
create institutions whose workings will give life to a conception of
justice-no less institutions that can effectively decide on the content
of rights-can be left until later.
Much of the work in this vein-indeed in much moral philosophy
5. Philippe van Parijs, Social Justice as Real Freedom for All: A Reply to
Arneson, Fleurbaey, Melnyk and Selznick, 7 The Good Society 42, 48 (1997).
6. Michael Freeden, Rights 66 (1991).
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generally and political philosophy that is akin to itT-draws its
inspiration from what is often termed analytical philosophy where
rigorously inspecting value terms to see if they can or should include
value concepts captured by other terms is the order of the day. Must
the idea of rights, for example, include the idea of equality, and what
kind of equality is consistent with the idea of people having rights? It
is an exercise in conceptual analysis. My suggestion here is that much
more important is an account of the institutions that are to give the
values life: can they co-exist and under what terms? This tells more
about the consistency of our values than an analysis of how we use
words.
Some moral and political theorists working in this tradition do give
some consideration to institutions. Consider again van Parijs, who
says that "the intellectual endeavor in which I am engaged, along with
many other political philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition,
consists of trying to rigorously clarify political ideas by proposing
some explicit general principles and critically scrutinizing the concrete
institutional implications."'
Insofar as van Parijs considers
institutions, as opposed to policies, this is how he describes his efforts.
Much plainly depends on what "critically scrutinize" means.
Mostly, for van Parijs and others, it seems to mean asking whether we
can think up institutions that would do the job. That is something, but
it isn't much. For, to really "scrutinize." we would need to know
whether the citizens of the political order under consideration are
inclined to operate the institutions in the necessary fashion: whether
they can be induced to so operate them if they are not so inclined;
whether those who are to operate the institutions will have the
relevant skills and dispositions; and how the given institution will
work in the context of other institutions. Otherwise said, to deal with
these questions, we must look at actual citizens with their history,
virtues and vices, their institutional inheritance, and so on.
More generally, in thinking about the relation between values and
institutions, it is all too easy to defend a table of values and then turn
to consider how existing or proposed institutions conform. As a guide
to practice, such evaluations are, however, of little help: they are
about the wrong thing. If our concern is with practice, it is deeply
misleading to treat as two separate matters what we value and the
institutional means of realizing it. If we are concerned with practice,
we cannot know how much moral weight to give to our purposes
unless we know what it takes to realize them. With an eye to practice,
it is misleading simply to say that X is a value, or even that it is more
valuable than Y, and then with this in mind turn to evaluating the
means to achieve it. Evaluation in the context of practice cannot be
7. See, for example, the remarks about van Parijs that follow.
8. Van Parijs, supra note 5. at 42.
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an abstract exercise, pursued as if it were outside of the features of the
world in which the values are to be realized. This means that in our
evaluation of whether we should attempt to alter some practice, we
must know a good deal about the specific socio-political context in
which our efforts are to be made. In short, our evaluative weightings
must combine the normative and the empirical: they cannot be
abstract but must be concrete in the sense that how valuable we count
some end or standard will vary by context. As Lon Fuller says in
discussing equality, "[u]ntil we find some means by which equal
treatment can be defined and administered, we do not know the
meaning of equality itself."9 There aren't two separate points-one
about the value itself, the other about practice and what it takes to
serve it. There is only one judgment: how much we value something
given what it takes to realize it. 10
Our evaluations then should be a mix of what we value tutored by
what it takes to realize it in the world." For many readers this will all
be obvious, and indeed I think it is. But a perusal of the
contemporary literature in moral and political philosophy suggests
otherwise. There is far too little sense that political-moral evaluation
without institutional detail is seriously deficient. A good institutional
design requires that those who operate and support it are willing and
able to do so-or that they will plausibly come to do so. Justice-for
some the first virtue of political institutions-is after all a practical
virtue concerned with how our collective life should be carried on.
Stated differently, coherence in theory need not mean coherence in
practice: to assume otherwise is to give more weight to words than
they can bear. Similarly, to show incoherence in theory does not
mean incoherence in practice. We often act in contradictory fashion,
and continue to do so because, as often as not, we can proceed
without terrible consequences.
Behind these failures of what might be called means-ends moral
and political philosophy, lies, I think, a deeper failing. Implicit in such
arguments is that there exists a decision-maker to whom advice is
being tendered concerning the appropriate ends of political action.
But this is to misconstrue the fundamental problem of political action,
9. Lon L. Fuller, Means and Ends, in The Principles of Social Order: Selected
Essays of Lon Fuller 47, 62 (1981).
10. Cf. Michael Novak's comment that "[t]he notion that an unworkable ideal is a
morally acceptable ideal, however, troubled me. If an ideal doesn't work, isn't that
evidence that it is out of touch with human reality? Isn't that a sign that it is a false
ideal?" Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism 198 (1982)(emphasis in original).
Consider also here Lon Fuller's comment that "no abstractly conceived end ever
remains the same after it has been given flesh and blood through some specific form
of social implementation." Fuller, supra note 9, at 55. This whole essay is of the
greatest importance for the argument I am making here.
11. "For if the real meaning of an ideal depends upon its tacit institutional
background, a shift in the latter is sure to disturb the former." Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, False Necessity 20-21 (1987).
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at least in the pluralistic political systems that have most of our
allegiance. Political judgment ought instead to start with the design of
the political institutions that will make the value choices, because
fundamental to deciding what we wish for is whether and how it is
possible to get those who are willing to do the judging, to actually do
so. This includes not only authorities but citizens as well-at least in a
democracy-since citizens will reward or punish these authorities
depending on what judgments they arrive at. Or, at least, they ought
to do so. In saying all this, it becomes obvious that what we have is a
constitutional problem: how to constitute the institutions that will do
the job of judging. We are now concerned with multiple decisionmakers and the crucial questions become how they are to be related
to one another, what will induce them to behave in the necessary
ways, what will insure that they have the necessary abilities, and so
forth.
Now, some will object that we cannot escape the language of means
and ends. What are the values of liberty, justice and equality and the
like, if not ends-and institutions are the means to serve them. Here I
want simply to say that in pointing to the institutions that compose a
political order, I am talking about purposes. But purposes are not
necessarily ends. If I say I wish to develop certain of my capabilities, I
am talking about the ability not to achieve a particular end but a series
of ends, most of which I cannot conceive of as I set out to develop
these capabilities. I am saying, in effect, that the best I can do is to
prepare myself for a whole host of situations where I will want to
serve particular ends, and my purpose is to enable me to respond
intelligently to these situations. So it is with political societies. The
substantive ends we wvish to pursue are difficult to define. There is too
much we do not know. We cannot design our institutions as means to
serve values if they are understood as substantive ends in the direct
service of which we shape our institutions. I wvill come back to this
matter below.
Many of these problems concerning the relation between political
institutions and value, and the more general problem of good political
practice, arise in what is widely perceived to be the most important
work in political philosophy in the twentieth century, John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice.2
The outline of Rawls' theory is well known. He offers a theory of
justice anchored in an account of organizing principles for a whole
society that rational people would choose if they made their choices
behind what Rawls calls the "veil of ignorance." Behind this veil,
12. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Although I will be critical here of
Rawls' basic approach to political theory, his work is a major step forward in moral
philosophy since it shows how the basic structure of society can be the subject of
normative analysis and choice. Political theory, of course, has since its inception
always taken this to be a central question.
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people will not know what their position would be in a society
designed to serve these principles. The rest of the book is devoted to
developing the implications of these principles of justice, as Rawls
calls them, for the organization of various important elements of a
society. It is, says Rawls, an exercise in ideal theory, 3 whose concern
is with "the form a just society would take in a world 'in which, for
theoretical purposes, everyone is presumed to act justly.""'
Let us suppose that an important aim of political philosophy is to
help create the best political regime of which we are capable. This
seems to be a view Rawls shares. Otherwise why does he bother with
lengthy discussions of the rule of law, the organization of the economy
and how a sense of justice might develop since each of these is not, or
not only, a deduction from the principles of justice but things found in
the world as it is? Moreover, Rawls is clear15 that he is not only
concerned with a "strict compliance theory" of justice where everyone
is assumed to act justly but also with a "partial compliance theory"
which concerns "how we are to deal with injustice.' 6 And crucially,
Rawls says that "the reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it
provides the only basis for the systematic grasp of' the "more pressing
problems" such as "weighing one form of institutional justice against
another," and he goes on to say that "I shall assume that a deeper
understanding can be gained in no other way."17
There are other reasons to do political philosophy besides a concern
to promote good political practice. These include developing utopias
that highlight the differences between where we are now, what
humankind is capable of, and what would simply be best. In doing
such work, we may provide humankind with an impulse toward great
change. 18 This kind of effort may also tell us much about the human
condition, as well as what sort of enterprise politics is compared to
other forms of human endeavor.' 9
13. Philip Pettit says this effort in ideal theory is one in which Rawls and similarly
inclined philosophers "have preferred to spend. . . their time reflecting on the
meaning of consent, or the nature of justice, or the basis of political obligation." Philip
Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 240 (1997). Bernard
Williams says, a propos of philosophers like Rawls who have been shaped by it, that
"[a]nalytic philosophy has been much taken up with defining things." Bernard
Williams, The Reluctant Philosopher,Times Literary Supplement, May 29, 1998, at 18.
14. Ian Carter, A Critique of Freedom as Non-domination,9 The Good Society 43,
47 (1999).
15. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 12, at 9.
16. Id. at8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. "May" because there may be no way to bridge the gap between where we are
and progress along a path marked out by the utopia. On whether we should take such
a path see the discussion below.
19. The aim of utopias is:
to picture the awful distance between the possible and the probable by
showing in great detail how men could live, even though they always refuse
to do so. .

.

. For the fault [of our refusing] is not in God, fate, or nature,
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But, if as I have said, Rawls' undertaking has a practical side to it indeed if it is, in the end, partly justified by its value for defining good
political practice-then it is an odd and misleading enterprise?
Consider the question of whether we are more likely to succeed in
creating the best political regime of which we are capable if we start
with an account of what might be called the "circumstances of justice"
or the "circumstances of politics."2'- In the circumstances of justice
there is a veil of ignorance and no problem of compliance once the
content of justice is known. At issue is what a political order should
look like among people who are already committed to a common
sense of justice. The problem, therefore, is to work out what is
contained in that conception of justice, and in the structure of politics
and society that is consistent with it. The circumstances of politics, on
the other hand, may be defined as a state of affairs in which there is a
large aggregation of people who have conflicting purposes which
engender more or less serious conflict; who are given to attempts to
use political power to further their own purposes and those they
identify with; who are given to attempts to use political power to
subordinate others unlike themselves; and who are sometimes given
to thoughts and actions that suggest that they value limiting the use of
political power by law and harnessing it to public purposes.
In a phrase, my argument is that we will be "better off" if we start
from the circumstances of politics. "Better off" here refers to a
political order that will garner wide-spread support in the form of civil
peace, and that will be widely thought a good or decent political
order. Indeed, it is entirely possible that more of Rawlsian justice will
be achieved if we take full account of the circumstances of politics as
our starting point. The "ideal" that should guide political practice
ought to be built around the circumstances of politics, not abstracted
from it.
How should we proceed instead? We should start from the
circumstances of politics because these set the problem of securing
but in ourselves-where it will remain. .

. . If one thinks that the only
purpose of political philosophy is to provide serviceable guides to action for
politicians and political groups, then indeed utopia [is] a useless enterprise.
If critical understanding and judgment, however, are also real ends, then the
construction of such models is not only justifiable, it is a perfect instrument.
Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory 1-2 (1969)
(emphasis in original).
20. As ideal theory, the argument also leaves something to be desired. How much
inthe way of Shklar's "critical understanding and judgment" that utopian thinking
can bring comes from a theory that invites endless discussion of whether the etiolated
instrumentally rational human beings at the heart of Rawls' theory would indeed
choose his two principles of justice? Cf Colin McGinn's comment about a social
contract argument that parallels Rawls': "what is the point of unity with purely
hypothetical others?" Colin McGinn, Reasons and Unreasons. The New Republic,
May 24, 1999, at 34.
21. The first is Rawls' phrase although he uses it for other purposes.
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any good political order. We must first prevent the worst before we
can achieve the good enough, no less the best. Any plausible account
of human motives will posit that human beings are capable of the
grossest cruelty, of a desire to tyrannize their fellows and a whole host
of lesser evils. If we do not prevent these from happening there is
little reason to suppose that citizens and those who speak for them
will have the leeway to pursue even the good enough. This is the basic
contention of much of liberal theory, or at least of that branch of it
that is not attempting to compete with strong democrats on their own
turf-and it means that, contrary to Rawls' theory, we do not best
grasp the nub of partial compliance theory by focusing on ideal
theory. Rather, we best understand partial compliance theory when
we understand just why there can only be partial compliance and what
we need to do to make it possible to achieve even this modest state of
affairs. Thus, Madison teaches that we cannot have republican
government by positing that men are angels.22 The circumstances of
politics are, to an important degree, irremediable, and if our account
of good political regimes is not tempered by this knowledge then it
will fail.
Rawls' argument is, in effect, that we should first construct a
luminous image in order to define the political road down which we
should travel. But notice that the road is defined by having a citizenry
inclined to act justly. Is it probable that real human beings will more
likely achieve a just regime if we start down this road, as compared to
one which is defined by the circumstances of politics, and where the
conception of justice is inflected by taking account of the facts about
human behavior?' The ideal road is a dangerous road because its
basic features do not square with how humankind does or plausibly
can behave. Hence my earlier comment that going down a Rawlsian
road may well produce less Rawlsian justice than proceeding down
the path marked out by the circumstances of politics. As Stanley
Rosen says, "[i]t is not enough to say that we advocate the noble as
opposed to the base. . . In politics, whether world-historical or
local, it is always necessary to specify the particular case.''24
At the most general level, we can say that the road to the good or
good enough regime does not coincide with the road to the ideal
regime, being just a stop along the way. This is the point of the theory
of the second best, and of the phrase that the best is the enemy of the
good. Following the road to the best is not likely to avoid
engendering major conflicts; and, because we are unlikely to have
22. The Federalist No. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
23. Cf. Glen Newey's comment that we need "to reinstate politics itself in
political philosophy." Glen Newey, How Do We Find Out What He Meant?, Times
Literary Supplement, June 26, 1998, at 29.
24. Stanley Rosen, The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity 11
(1989).
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made any provision to handle them, they will be devastating. The
pursuit of the ideal, which is by definition beyond us, may well bring
out the worst in us. Moreover, effort expended on the ideal is effort
lost to the good. Not to mention that pursuit of the ideal, which must
fail, is also likely to be dispiriting. And finally, if we shape institutions
with an eye to moving towards the ideal, there is little reason to
suppose that these institutions will be of much use in securing a good
regime, which is all we can hope to achieve. Indeed, there is every
reason to suppose that these institutions will make it harder to achieve
a good regime since they will not be, as I have indicated, well designed
for politics as it will emerge on the road to the good or good enough.
Again, the prevention of the worst is crucial here.
Rawls, along with many other moral and political philosophers,
apparently finds it difficult to accept that the real subject of political
theory is politics-the only intermittently principled, more often selfinterested play of ambition, power and interest. If this is so, then in
the effort to create good regimes we should take humankind as it is,
and might plausibly become, as central to our normative claims. We
should try to ensure that the worst of what we are does not dominate,
and that the best of what we are and can be governs at least some of
the time. If we can manage that, we very likely have accomplished all
of which we are capable.
B. Regimes
Even if we understand that values and institutions cannot be
separated as ends and means, there is more to constitutional thinking.
We cannot usefully talk about institutions taken one at a time, as if
they exist independently of one another. The temptation, for
example, is to look at the distribution of income and the institutions
that generate it and announce-given a common definition of
equality-that they fall short and must be changed, and to replicate
the exercise across the board, taking each value and set of institutions
one at a time.' Nor is it useful to talk about trade-offs among values
without consideration of the institutional means that will give them
life-as if we could have any mix we wished and our only problem is
how much of one value we wish to give up to get more of the others.Zb
25. See generally, James W. Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science

(1990).
26. The widespread talk about trade-offs reflects the success that economists have
had in shaping our talk about the public world. Economists teach that all problems of

choice are ones of economizing-how much we must give up of one thing we value in
order to get more of another. This is as true of major political institutions as it is of
apples and pears. The apparent difference in importance and complexity is just that,
apparent, and the sooner we see that everything can be weighed in terms of
preference satisfaction, utility or money-all of which enable us to think about what
use of our resources is efficient and thus allow us to judge the worth of something
compared to something else-then the more rational will be our public life. There are
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In making these sorts of arguments, we miss the fundamental point
that political institutions are parts of political wholes.
Institutions come, it would seem, in packages-and, very likely, in
big packages; that is, they exist as parts of what might be called
political regimes. In considering how the various institutions that
compose a regime are to be put together, we cannot pick and choose
among the various possibilities in a kind of rationalism of the machine
shop27-considering political institutions one at a time, and using them
or not according to their individual capabilities. This might be called
the "organ" theory of political design (we ain't got no body, only
individual organs).
It thus is likely that political regimes cannot be composed of just
any combination of institutions. Institutions aren't mechanisms but
patterns of behavior-and some patterns will undercut others. These
patterns of behavior, or practices, are interconnected; what we can
and ought to do about one set of practices has strong implications for
what happens or ought to happen elsewhere in the political-economic
order.28 Thus, Hayek comments that "we are not fully free to pick and
choose whatever combination of features we wish our society to
possess, or to fit them together into a viable whole: that is, that we
cannot build a desirable social order29 like a mosaic by selecting
whatever particular parts we like best.
If institutions indeed come in packages, what accounts for this?
What makes the set of institutions political wholes? The answer,
given in classical political theory, is that these wholes- political
regimes-are institutional expressions of types of political rule and of
the conception of justice that legitimates and helps to define the
purposes of that rule.3" Thus, there is rule by the one, the few and the
lots of sarcastic replies to be made to such hubris-including such choice oldies as,
here is a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. But the
best comment is probably made by the internationally distinguished economist A.K.
Sen who said that a society can be (Pareto) efficient and perfectly disgusting. For my
own less pithy view of the matter, see Stephen L. Elkin, Economic and Political
Rationality, 18 Polity 253, 253-71 (1985) [hereinafter Elkin, Economic and Political
Rationality].
27. See Stephen L. Elkin, Market and Politics in Liberal Democracy, 92 Ethics
720, 720-32 (1982) [hereinafter Elkin, Market and Politics in Liberal Democracy];
Elkin, Economic and Political Rationality, supra note 26; and Elkin, Political
Institutions and PoliticalPractise,in Handbook of Political Theory and Policy Science
111 (E. Portis and M. Levy eds. 1988).
28. Hayek says that:
By "order" we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a
multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we
may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the
whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least
expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.
Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation and Liberty, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis omitted).
29. Id. at 59.
30. Aristotle says that "[a] constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and
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many. There have also been efforts to elaborate and modify this
typology so that we can, for example, talk about totalitarian tyrannies
and people's democracies.3' A political regime in these accounts
encompasses not only what we might call the political system, but also
what is typically encompassed under the heading of economy and
society. Economy and society are forms of rule without the sword (or
at least without much direct and continuous swordplay) and to a
significant degree they extend the rule of the polity through other
means. In addition, both economy and society draw their legitimacy,
at least in part, from the same conception of justice that helps to
legitimate the polity.
A widespread commitment to a certain conception of rule and to its
accompanying conception of justice will make it difficult for certain
kinds of institutions to flourish. For example, institutional forms
lacking a measure of democratic accountability are difficult to sustain
in popular regimes, as are those whose express purpose is to foster
inequality. We might say that there is an ethos at work which,
through the weight of opinion and the power attached to it, imparts a
logic to the political whole. The form of rule and the conception of
justice generates a set of mores and practices that find expression
throughout the society. Those who wish to and do wield power reach
for these mores and refer to these practices as they claim their right to
exercise that power. Who is to rule and to what purpose is the
defining element of political life-that which gives the regime a form,
a distinctive character.
Being an institutional expression of a type of political rule, the
regime also has a ruling stratum, those who are most devoted to the
particular manner of governing and the justice at which it aims. They
are a principal source of those who claim the right to wield power and
who, in fact, do so. The political influence of the ruling stratum
reinforces the logic of the particular type of political rule. In a
popular regime, the ruling strata will be large in number, perhaps as
much as a majority of the citizenry. As for the rule of one, even kings,
not to mention totalitarian leaders, cannot govern by themselves.
Their rule will inevitably rest on the shoulders of a group of significant
determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each
community." Aristotle, Politics in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 2046 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that political science
studies "what sorts of influences preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve
and destroy the particular kinds of constitution...." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 1867 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton Univ.

Press 1984). See also Ceaser, supra note 25; Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in
the American Republic 102-200 (1987) [hereinafter Elkin, City and Regime]; Stephen
G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political

Philosophy (1990).
31. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (1951); Carl 1. Friedrich,
Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views

(1969).
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size which, together with the ruler, compose the ruling strata.
The ruling stratum need not be politically dominant in the sense of
controlling the substance of law and policy. Indeed, in a modern,
organizationally complex and broadly democratic society, such control
is unlikely. The ruling stratum rules, at a minimum, in the sense that
its conception of political rule and justice is the one given expression
in the institutional design of the regime and reached for when political
justification is sought.
In good regimes,32 the conception of rule and of justice aren't just
expressions of the self-interest of the ruling stratum. The stratum may
benefit in large ways from these conceptions; this, after all, forms part
of the reason for their attachment to the conceptions in the first place.
But as Walzer emphasizes, the conception of rule and of justice are
standards by which the ruling stratum will itself be judged.33 They
express what plausibly is a good way to rule and what plausibly really
is a form of justice.
The impact of the regime is not confined to the laws it makes and
their direct effects on the citizenry. In well-ordered popular regimes,
for example, the impact of public decisions on most people's lives in
the sense of direct intervention-an injunction to do this or stop
that-is, while significant, not the dominant effect. It isn't the cop at
the door or the check in the mail, but a whole background of rules,
assumptions, and definitions of what is acceptable, all of which form
the context within which individuals make their own decisions. In this
sense, political life is not mostly machinery producing outputs of
decisions, but is a culture or way of life.
If institutions come in packages, how are the packages to be
evaluated? If there are several kinds of good regimes what makes
them good in the first place? Why, as in the classical formulation, are
kingship, aristocracy and a mixed form of popular rule superior to
tyranny, oligarchy and direct rule by the mass? Which among the
modern forms of rule are good regimes: that is, which among
constitutional or liberal democracy, people's democracy, strong
democracy, mild authoritarianism and totalitarianism are to be
preferred?
I have suggested a starting point for answering this question. What
makes regimes good is simply that they aim at a defensible conception
of justice, and in doing so they are lawful. Power is to be constrained
by standards inherent in the conception of justice. All good regimes
are regimes with limits on how power can be used. Bad regimes then
either do not claim to serve justice, or their conceptions are
indefensible. A signal trait of such regimes is that power is
unbounded, unmarked by standards that transcend the desire of the
32. Below I will consider on what grounds we can call them good regimes.
33. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 9 (1983). See also the discussion infra.
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rulers. Evil is frightening because it knows no bounds, its force is
unlimited. It is antinomian.

Thus, large aggregations of people devoted to mass plunder may
not be regimes at all if they are held together by force. Similarly,
aggregations that aim at ethnic or racial subordination, whether on
their own, or with their terrified populations in tow, may not be
regimes. For both this is especially clear if the use of force regularly
threatens to, or actually becomes, unbounded. Such aggregations
advance no conception of justice. Alternatively, the least ferocious of
such aggregations may be regimes-albeit bad ones-in that they
advance a conception of how political rule should be carried on and a
conception of the justice at which that rule aims. There is thus some
talk of the limits on political power. But these claims to rule cannot
withstand scrutiny even if they are widely accepted by those whose
lives are shaped by them. Typically, in such regimes, an elite is
defined as those to whom the rules that are to guide the mass of the
regime's members do not apply, and no convincing case is or can be
made about why this should be so. The claim to secure justice is thus
greatly weakened and probably vitiated.-'
The evaluation of regimes is not, however, an abstract or
universalizing exercise as the preceding might imply. We must look to
the circumstances of the people who are attempting to realize a
certain sort of regime, or to the circumstances of the people to whom
a type of regime is being commended." That is, regimes-forms of
rule-are not just good or bad; they are also good or bad for a people
with particular histories, virtues and vices. Here, again, as with the
consideration of particular values and institutions, evaluation must be
heavily empirical, since we must have an understanding of how the
institutions (those institutions that are to give life to the values) are to
work, and how, together, they are to constitute the regime. As part of
34. To say any more here means to move into the deeper reaches of political
philosophy. I will only add that my view of how to distinguish between good and bad
regimes draws on that strand of classical political philosophy that looks to the kind of
beings we are. Defensible conceptions of justice are rooted in defensible conceptions
of human nature-what goods or ends or virtues we can say are necessary to human
well-being and what states of affairs, purposes and vices we should guard against. For
an excellent argument along these lines, see generally Salkever. supra note 30.
While it is here-on the questions of what it means to say that something is good
and on what basis we can say it-that moral philosophy and political theory
influenced by it have much to say, once again when we get to the matter of good
regimes, we are making heavily empirically informed judgments. The good is an
amalgam of the desirable and the possible.
35. If the western economists who gave advice to the Russian government on how
to affect the transition to a democratic regime married to an enterprise-based market
system had given this matter more than passing attention, Russia and the United
States would both be better off than at present. At a minimum, disciplinary blinders
reinforced by disciplinary chauvinism made what ought to be the startingpoint of any
competent regime analysis into a heroic feat of intellectual sophistication, and thus
was not much in evidence among those advisors.
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this inquiry we need to investigate how and whether the requirements
for making these institutions work in the necessary ways square with
what we know of the habits and outlook of the people who are to
operate them. The recent sad experience of various African attempts
to realize stable and attractive forms of popular rule indicates how
important such empirical understanding is. The one obvious thing
about political life is that it happens in particular places among
particular peoples with particular characteristics. This does not mean
that no universal definitions of the right and the good are possible.
But it does mean that if we are interested in political practice, the
definition of criteria must be tailored to the broadly understood
situation in which the particular people find themselves.
Much of the preceding can be brought together in a single
formulation. A regime is a conception of rule aimed at a conception
of justice. The aim of constitutional theory is to specify the
institutions needed to realize that form of rule and the political
sociology that gives political energy to that rule. To which can be
added, as we shall see, that constitutional theory also needs to spell
out the public interest of the regime. Constitutional theory is built on
the proposition that the most important step in evaluation of political
practices is the regime question.
A theory of the political constitution of a good regime then has,
among its essential features, a specification of the particular
institutions that compose the regime-those that give it its
characteristic manner of working-and how they are to be related to
one another. We may say that these institutions define how the
people who are to carry on their life within the regime are to be
related to one another-as they go about coping with the difficult-topredict possibilities and problems that will arise, and the conflicts
attendant on their common fate. A political constitution is composed
of the modes of association a people employ as they go about
attempting to confront collective problems, cope with the conflicts
that will attend such efforts, and deal with the continuing temptation
to use political institutions for arbitrary action and political
domination. Institutions create what may be termed an environment
of choice: they do not force a particular result but rather encourage
those who are within their ambit to take account of particular kinds of
considerations when they act.
In thus helping to define the terms under which people have access
to one another, the political constitution of the regime helps shape the
habits of mind and mores of a people. It also reflects in its institutions
these mores or more broadly, the dominant conception of justice. The
political constitution shapes the over-all way of life of a people; and
indeed it makes them a people. 6 "Constitution," in the sense
36. Graham Walker says, "[a] constitution is a polity's normative architecture; it is
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employed here, refers to the "shape," "composition," or
"establishment" of a people in their political association.- The
constitution of a regime, then, not only sets out offices and powers,
the frame of government, but more generally, an "ordering" by which
the organization (order) of something gives it its constitution. A
constitution then forms a polity, enabling it to act by giving it form. A
theory of political constitution defines the constitutive institutions
through which a regime acts.
We can thus say that the central concerns of constitutional theory
are the realization of good regimes, their maintenance once they are
in being, the prevention of bad regimes, and the problem of transition
from bad to good regimes. We can further say that in thinking about
good regimes, we can't decide first what to do, and then look for who
is to do it and how they are to do it. The question of what to do is
deeply shaped by who is capable of doing it and who should be
authorized to do it.
II. THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC

Constitutional theory proper does not turn on any particular way of
establishing which are desirable political regimes in general and for a
particular people. All it needs to get started-at least if its
practitioners are interested in actual peoples situated in particular
places-is some account of what sort of regime is to be realized with
the help of a theory of political constitution.
If then we are to think about the American case, what sort of
regime is to be the subject of our constitutional theorizing? I have
already said that good regimes must have some defensible conception
of justice. But which conception? One way to answer the question,
the one I will adopt here, is to look to the aspirations of a people-in
this case Americans.
What are our aspirations as Americans? Since we are, and must be,
situated somewhere, not nowhere, ' and thus have an inheritance of

institutions and language, our aspirations will to some degree reflect
these inherited practices. We cannot wholly lever ourselves out of the

social world that we inhabit. And thus our aspirations are likely to
stem, in part, from the thinking of those who have helped to set these
that ensemble of standards, aspirations, and practices that forms a people's political
identity and it is authoritative for their common life and institutions." Graham
Walker, The Constitutional Good: Constitutionalism'sEquivocal Moral Imperative, 26
Polity 91, 92 (1993).
37. Cicero, De Re Publica De Legibus (E.H. Warmington ed., 1928); Graham
Maddox, A Note on the Meaning of Constitution,76 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 805, 806-07
(1982).
3& See Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (1987) (discussing the
idea that we do not have to discover the moral world because we have always lived in
it; and thus we can derive our political and moral standards from an internal critique
of our practices).

1950

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

practices in motion-in our case, the founders of the American
republic. It is, in short, likely to be a regime that already has some
hold on us, some of whose features are already present and
prominently foreshadowed in our present practices.
We must, therefore, start where we are, so to speak, because we
cannot start anywhere else-and we use the local language and stock
of institutional ideas to give voice to what we hope for. We enter into
an on-going "rhetorical community" where words and their meanings,
and the argued-for purposes of our collective life have taken on a life
of their own, so that a variety of symbols and kinds of justifications
are not only ready to hand, but also recognizably "ours."
Given that our aspirations must, to some degree, stem from present
practices, a minimum account of our aspirations would point to our
desire to be a regime in which government is popular and limited, and
in which economic life is to be, at least in significant part, organized
through markets and private control of productive assets. Thus, we
want, first and foremost, to be a regime that has its foundations in
popular self-government, whose office holders are either chosen
through popular election or are chosen by those who have been. Our
aspiration is to realize a republican regime. The regime is republican
in the sense that the opinions of the governed will be regularly
consulted and will constrain the actions of governors. Moreover,
while government is to be popular, it is also to be limited, to carry on
its business through well-understood forms and towards well-defined
destinations. It is to be a regime of limited powers exercised
according to law so that each of us will be able to conduct our lives
free from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.
The regime is also to be a commercial one in the sense that
republican government is to be combined with a business enterprise
system which has a substantial private component, and in which these
enterprises are subject to the test of consumer preference through the
marketplace. We suppose that many of the decisions about how to
use society's resources ought to be in the hands of private persons and
private groups who will enter into a variety of cooperative and
exchange relationships to deploy these resources. Such an economy,
it is believed, will bring us high levels of material well-being. It is also
thought to facilitate republican government, not least because the
prosperity which it will bring, will, in turn, increase attachment to
republican principles. Commerce is thought to be useful for selfgovernment, not a principal source of its subversion.39
39. For some evidence about our aspirations, see Herbert McClosky and John
Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy
(1984); Robert E. Lane, Market Justice, PoliticalJustice, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 383
(1986); Pamela Johnson Conover et. al., Duty is a Four Letter Word: Democratic
Citizenship in a Liberal Polity (unpublished paper, University of North Carolina) (on
file with author).
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The idea of a republican regime is a capacious enough conception
of a desirable regime to secure agreement upon it from those who
count themselves legatees of both the Federalists and AntiFederalists,' and from people generally who otherwise might disagree
about political matters. Members of both of these traditions, or at
least those who first articulated the views that have come to be
associated with them, typically argued that free government depends
on some sort of marriage between popular limited government and
commerce." These are very broad commitments then, which is why it
is reasonable to think that they constitute the heart of our aspirations.
Insofar as our aspirations reflect our inheritance of institutions and
practices, we aspire then to be a commercial republic. I take it as
given, however, that to the degree we have a choice in the matter, we
do not wish to be a certain kind of regime simply on the grounds that
it is an inheritance that we must live with. The case for the
commercial republic as the focus of our aspirations would be more
convincing if it could be shown that this regime is not one whose
features sadden or horrify us, that it has value over and above what
can be claimed for it as an inheritance. What can be said to suggest
that this is so?
Since the regime we aspire to is essentially the one the founders of
this republic hoped to bring into being, can this distinctive fact about
our inheritance suggest anything about the value of our aspirations?
Lincoln indicates something of what this relation might be. He says:
I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever
our fathers [i.e., those who framed the government under which we
live] did. To do so, would be to. . . reject all progress-all
improvement. What I do say is, that if we would supplant the
opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon
evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great
authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most
surely not in a case whereof42 we ourselves declare they understood
the question better than we.
Lincoln might be interpreted as saying that we, contemporary
Americans, should show fidelity to the thought of the founders not
40. The latter would include those who are presently attempting to develop civic
republicanism as a guide to political practice.
41. This is not to say that the Anti-Federalists, like their successors, had no doubts
about the value of commerce. They had reservations about where it might lead, but
they still thought some version of it was essential if republican government was to
succeed. See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti Federalists Were For (1981). Cf.
J.G.A. Pocock's comment that "all serious thinkers in the eighteenth century
accepted commerce, and all had doubts about it" J.G.A. Pocock, Leters to the Editor,
N.Y. Review of Books, Oct. 19,2000, at 68.
42. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute New York City (Feb. 27,
1860), in Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859-1865, at 111, 119 (Library of America
1989).
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because it is old but because it is a source of what is valuable in us. It
has helped make us who we are. While it is possible to escape from
whom one is, and from whom we collectively are, it is not easy. Nor is
it desirable, at least if we have reason to believe, as Lincoln claimed
we do, that the thought and practice of those who came before us, at
their best, deserve not only our deepest consideration but also our
assent. We are rightly bound to them then for the same reason that
we are bound to honor any worthy part of ourselves. We thus can
only deny the aspirations built upon the thought and practice of the
founders of this republic by denying a significant portion of ourselves.
And in doing so, we not only are likely to feel bereft, having cut
something out of ourselves, but we are also likely to find it difficult to
answer the question of just who we are.
The same conclusion can be arrived at by a different route. Some
of our most powerful and sustained arguments on great political
matters concern the picture bequeathed to us by the founders of this
republic of the kind of regime we should aim to realize. And crucially,
the conclusion drawn among those willing and able to exchange
reasons has been that something very much like the founders' vision
of a commercial republic should guide us. This is not the only account
we have of what our aspirations should be, but it is the one of longest
standing, the most elaborated and the one that has been subject to the
greatest degree of searching argument.43 This reasoning has operated
through the invitation that many have offered to their fellow citizens
over our history to consider whether the outline of the regime the
founders commended to us ought to be widely assented to-and this
invitation has been eagerly taken up.
The normative force of our aspirations thus lies to a significant
degree in there being aspirations, since they have the authority of
reasoning not numbers behind them. They are the product of
intensive reasoning among many people-those, spread out over
many generations, who have been free enough and willing and able to
exchange reasons about the regime that is worthy of us.' "We" who
have aspirations are not those who merely talk about the political
right and good, nor those who are powerful.
Our aspirations then are a kind of halfway house between counting
opinions as a guide to what is valuable-all norms are conventionaland foundational justifications. The element of reasoning is the link
43. Those who are willing and able to so reason are the heirs of Bacon who
thought that a "wholly new politics of liberty was possible if the appetite of
'perfecting oneself' were harnessed to commercial and manufacturing instruments for
increasing prosperity." Hiram Caton, The Politics of Progress: The Origins and
Development of the Commercial Republic 1600-1835, at 48 (1988).
44. See Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 1-38 (1984); James
Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning 231-74 (1984). For a lengthier
statement, see Elkin, City and Regime, supra note 30, at 102-33; see also John Rawls,
Political Liberalism 1-86 (1993).
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to foundational justifications since our aspirations are open to revision
in light of more universal standards. Yet they are rooted in opinion in
the sense that they start with the present practices that are counted as
valuable among us.45 It should be added with regard to this universal
aspect of our aspirations that, given that we aspire to be the best form
of a commercial republic that we can manage, we are also committed
to looking to other regimes that may be counted as the best of their
kind. For, if we aspire to making the regime to which our aspirations
point the best of its kind, and this should prove impossible, we are
committed to looking to other regimes of similar stature. Having
already decided to aim at the best, why would we not? We, therefore,
must know how to identify the best-and we thus naturally move back
and forth between the municipal and the universal. In short, we are
always drawn outside our own community of thought and practice.
But why should we think of our inheritance from the founders as
our aspirations-that is, as our hopes not just for ourselves, but
realistically, mostly for those who come after us. Why should we have
aspirations at all since, given the way the world works, it is unlikely
that we who work to achieve them will receive many of the benefits?
It will be those who come after us whose lives will be made better by
any significant increase in the extent to which a commercial republic is
realized. Why should we care about them?
It is no answer to say that it is because they are our children. All of
them? Of course not. And in any case, if it is only our particular
offspring that we care about, it is surely irrational to try to improve
the political regime to which we are committed when it would be a
more efficient use of our resources as individuals to find a relatively
secure niche for our kin and otherwise leave things as they are.
Burke, who thought about this matter a good deal, commented that
"[p]eople will not look forward to posterity who never look backward
to their ancestors."'
We might interpret him as saying that our
aspirations, as they are rooted in the thought and practice of those
who came before us, are also our pledge to future generations. But
again, why make the pledge?
Justice or fairness might dictate that just as we think we deserve
some things from those who come before us, we should attempt to
provide the same or similar things to those who come after us. A
sense of justice and fairness is surely at work. But the deepest point, I
45. Consider here Leo Strauss' comment that in "a politically relevant- sense
evaluative distinctions "cannot be 'demonstrated"' and so classical political
philosophers addressed "men who, because of their natural inclinations as well as
their upbringing, took those distinctions for granted." Leo Strauss, On Classical
Political Philosophy, in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: Essays and
Lectures by Leo Strauss 49, 58 (Thomas L. Pangle ed., 1989).
46. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 119 (1790) (Penguin
ed. 1969).
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think, is more nearly that, as we understand that our very identity as
citizens has depended to some degree on those who came before us,
we can only think poorly of ourselves if we do not attempt to pass on
things of value-especially things of value which we ourselves have
inherited and which have shaped us in ways of which we approve. If
we cannot avoid shaping the very souls of those who come after us we
can only be disgusted with ourselves if we pay no attention to the
matter, or even act with malice, just as we will be disgusted with those
who have come before us if they have acted hatefully or thoughtlessly.
This is not a question of the right distribution of valued goods, which
is the principal concern of most accounts of justice and fairness-this
time concerning justice between generations.
It is a more
fundamental matter, perhaps best expressed as a recognition of a
fundamental human injunction: just as those who come before us
have an obligation not thoughtlessly or cruelly to make it harder for
us, the living, to make our own way, so we must do the same for those
who follow us. We ought then to wish to exercise the deepest care
about what we pass on if indeed the very souls of those who come
after us are at issue. Of course, we wish also to attend to our present
concerns, but we also have reasons to forbear from only thinking
about ourselves.
Here then is Burke's partnership between the living and the dead
and those yet to be born.47 It all depends on recognizing that we do
not spring full blown from our own wombs so to speak. The kind of
reasoning that I have said lies at the base of our aspirations is a kind
of dialogue between the living and the dead and the unborn, a
dialogue conducted perhaps with more rationality than Burke may
have thought possible, but a conversation of sorts with just those
interlocutors he thought were essential to political evaluation.
The normative force of our aspirations thus lies finally in their being
the product of reasoning among many people-those, spread out over
many generations, who have been free enough and willing and able to
exchange reasons about the regime that we should aim at, and not
only for their own sakes but for the sake of those who come after
them.
In the end, perhaps the most convincing argument for starting with
our aspirations, understood as freely given accounts of people able
and willing to reason, comes in the form of a rhetorical question. Are
there likely to be a significant number of Americans who would think
that a move toward a fuller realization of our aspirations in the form I
have set them out would be a bad thing? Some no doubt would,
including for example, those who cannot conceive of any regime they
would find acceptable that had any significant measure of private
47. See David Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance: Self and Community from
Edmund Burke to Robert Frost 43-78 (1989).
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control of productive assets. Racists and misogynists would also find
such fuller realization unattractive. But once we lay aside the
demands of either complete agreement or of a dispositive
rationality-assuming these are even plausible foundations-might
not most of us actually say, after we bring to greater fruition a
commercial republican regime, that we are better off?. In any event,
the experience of political reform efforts over the last two centuries
tells us that it will be hard enough to move closer to the realization of
our aspirations, no less to realize even very imperfectly something
more demanding.
There is always, of course, the chance that I am wrong in all of
this-and in two ways. First, a great deal of evidence of the quality
and content of this conversation over the generations I have been
describing would be needed to test my argument, and that evidence
might show that my account is inaccurate. My reply here is simply
that what I have suggested to be the case is enough to start the
discussion of the theory of political constitution. No one will contend,
I think, that the aspirations I have set out are not held by a significant
number of people, even if they are not in fact the most elaborated and
the product of the most searching argument.
Second, it might be the case that what I say are our aspirations are
not in fact the product of reasoning, but are no more than cynically
offered justifications by the powerful for the purpose of protecting
their well-padded and dominant places in our collective life. To take
the worst case, what I have called our aspirations might be mere
ideology. They can't be just that, however, since as Michael Walzer
says, the principles of justification offered by the powerful are not
ones they would choose to offer if they were choosing now. Having
offered them at some earlier point, their actions are now likely to be
criticized in light of them. 48 They can, of course, attempt to offer new
criteria and standards, but this is a losing game since the more they do
this the more obvious it becomes that they are merely cynical powergrubbers and not worthy of our allegiance. We then may obey out of
fear but not out of respect, and respect is valued even by cynical
power-seekers since it is useful to them-being a cheaper way to get
their plans carried out than through the use of even the most carefully
calibrated violence and terror.
E.P. Thompson, a historian widely noted for being deeply critical of
the English ruling class, makes the point as well as anyone.
The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal
more than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in
profound ways, the behavior of the powerful, and mystify the
powerless. They may disguise the true realities of the power, but, at
the same time, they may curb that power and check its intrusions.
48. See Walzer, supra note 33, at 9.
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And it is often from within that very rhetoric that a radical critique
of the practice of the society is developed. ..

.

III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST

We are now in a position to consider the idea of the public interest
for the commercial republic and with it, the problems of economic
equality and the political place of controllers of productive assets as
they are manifest in this sort of regime.
As one of several kinds of good regimes, a commercial republic is a
conception of rule aimed at a conception of justice. Which conception
of justice? A commercial republic is a liberal regime-and, as such, a
plausible conception of the justice at which it aims centers on the
creation of a free and equal people capable of self-government.
There may be some dissent about whether I have properly
characterized liberal justice. But for the purposes of constitutional
theory this matters much less than is often supposed. Any conception
of liberal justice is too broad to be of much direct guidance to the lawmaking that is a central concern of constitutional theory. Moreover,
even differing conceptions will point in similar directions, and it is
unlikely that any differences in the conception of liberal justice will
point law-making down substantially different paths.
Our aspirations are also of limited help in giving strong guidance to
the substance of law-making. They, too, are a source of normative
guidance; they are the flip side of liberal justice, and concern the kind
of liberal regime that is to realize this justice. But our aspirations are
also too broad in form. It could hardly be otherwise, since normative
commitments of the kind found in aspirations are, in general, very
broad; they are meant to orient us in a wide range of situations, many
of which cannot be predicted beforehand.
Both our aspirations to realize a certain kind of regime and the
conception of justice that constitute the deepest purpose of that
regime do, however, indicate something of what law-making should
consist. It is to be used to help realize a free and equal people capable
of self-government through the securing of a commercial republican
form of rule. But this is not specific enough. What is needed here is
the kind of guidance that is not so broad as to provide little direction
for law-making but not so specific as to turn law-making into
administration.
The name usually given to this in-between
formulation is the "public interest."
What reason is there to think that there is anything that
corresponds to the idea of the public interest? This is an especially
pressing question since social science and political theory are shot
through with arguments that there is no such thing. Thus, there are
49. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 265 (1975).
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the mid-twentieth century behavioral political scientists and late
century post-modem social theorists, and many in between, who hold
views that run from one extreme, that the public interest is merely a
rhetorical cover for the exercise of power, to the other extreme that
individuals can have no other palpable interests beyond what can
accrue to them personally. In the riveting words of Margaret
Thatcher, there is no such thing as "society."
Any conception of the public interest thus must walk a precarious
path between the view that there isn't any such thing, only the
aggregated interests of those who compose the society, and that there
is such a thing and it possesses detailed specifications.
The
weaknesses of each are apparent. If there is only aggregation, what
shall we say about the rules that make aggregation possible? Are we
indifferent to how it occurs, whether it is fair? If we do care about
such matters, what will promote and make those rules secure? A
citizenry with a certain character situated in a certain economic
condition? This begins to look very much like a discussion of the
public interest. Moreover, if we think that the rules of aggregation
must be fair, the justification of such rules cannot itself rest on an
aggregation of preferences. It is unlikely that rules of fairness and the
like would emerge from any such procedure-and so, again, we are
more than halfway to a conception of the public interest as the rules
that ought to structure our politics.
Very much the same thing occurs with those we might call strong
proceduralists-those who look, for example, to democratic
deliberation itself to guarantee the goodness or rightness of the laws
that emerge. Notice first that deliberation is exceedingly difficult if
those involved are understood as living nowhere in particular. What
will they talk about? Where will they start? Is any starting point
sufficient? If not, why? If yes, what, if anything, distinguishes this
from the public interest? In addition, many procedural theories
smuggle in substantive conceptions of the public interest in their
specification of the circumstances in which reasoning is to occur.
Thus, it is sometimes said that the reasoners must be equal. Yes, very
likely, but that amounts to saying that one of the things the reasoners
must do in their deliberations is to try to secure equality. The
difference between such a procedural conception of the public interest
and a more substantive one is not readily apparent.
Again, there are those who argue that the only real test for the
goodness or rightness of a political order is that the people shall rule.
These we may call strong democrats. But what is being claimed in this
argument? That whenever a large aggregation of people come
together, whatever they decide must be right? Any aggregation?
How about a howling mob? If not, there must be criteria to
distinguish a band of thieves from other groups of people-and if
there are such criteria, then surely it is the task of good law-making to
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secure them. The difference between this task for law-making and the
public interest is not easily discernible either.
The view that there is only one detailed conception of the public
interest, which commits law-makers in detail and in advance of the
choices they will need to make, is both impossible and unwise. No
one can see far enough into the future to provide detailed guidance
for law-makers. Moreover, why should we attempt to bind lawmakers in this hard and fast manner if we want them to be lawmakers, not clerks? Why, indeed, do we want law-makers at all, if the
substance of the public interest is so readily discernible in all its
detail? If we are to have law-making, law-makers must have
discretion, and a significant part of the burden of giving content to the
public interest must fall on them.
If it is accepted that there is something to talk about under the
heading of the public interest, we already have a clue how to proceed.
I have indicated that in thinking about political value, one must think
simultaneously about the possibility and the cost of institutions that
can give such values life.
An institutional conception of the public interest has impressive
advantages. It is, for a start, broad enough to be applicable to
changing circumstances. Whatever else the public interest is, it must
provide direction in what are largely unknown, variable
circumstances. By contrast, a conception of the public interest made
up of policy goals quickly outlives its usefulness, and it can provide
little guidance once the particular world it was designed for passes
away, as it must. A focus on institutions or modes of association
designed to enable members of a political community to cope
intelligently with such unknowns is more promising.
An even more important advantage of this institutional conception
is that it enables us to make sense of the common intuition that
politics is less about getting to some destination than about how we
stand in relation to another wherever we are going. Many political
theorists have sensed that destinations are hard to define for whole
political orders: the world is too uncertain and we differ too much to
agree on anything very detailed. What seems more important is that
we are related to one another in durable and attractive ways. Such a
view also draws on a deep sense on the part of many theorists that too
much in the way of substantive social purposes undercuts liberty:
individuals should be the principal holders of purposes. In addition, it
draws upon the sense that society-wide planning has been shown to be
very unattractive and unmanageable: after all, if there really is a
public interest composed of a comprehensive set of substantive ends,
then 5 our
politics should be an exercise in planning to serve those
0
ends.
50. See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision
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Finally, an institutional view of the public interest makes sense of
the idea that if we desire a certain political way of life we must put a
good deal of effort into creating and maintaining it. Such a complex
form of collective life is unlikely to come into being by itself, and it is
not very likely that it will maintain itself through its ordinary
workings. If we value a regime, we must value the efforts of lawmakers to secure it, which is to say, we must have a conception of the
public interest. Not to value these efforts is to belie our commitment
to that regime, and to render ourselves both foolish and feckless.
A similar evaluation of an institutional conception of the public
interest has been offered by both Samuel Huntington and Bernard
Crick. Huntington comments that "the capacity to create political
institutions is the capacity to create public interests."51 Crick says that
the public interest is simply a way of "describing the common interest
in preserving the means of making public decisions politically."5
There is a second thread to follow in giving substance to the public
interest in addition to its institutional content. I have argued that
institutions come in packages, in regimes. Taken together then, we
are after a conception of the public interest that will be derived from
our aspirations to be a commercial republican regime and from the
liberal justice it is to serve, and that will be institutional in substance as well as pointing to the assembly of institutions that compose this
regime.
The first step then in giving an account of the public interest is to
see what of some specificity can be derived from liberal justice and
our aspirations. There are, at least, seven components of the public
interest that can be so derived, and their status as an element of the
public interest comes from this derivation. Each element has been the
subject of considerable scrutiny-and it has been argued by a wide
range of theorists of liberalism and popular self-government that any
good political order must aim to realize them. Moreover, each can be
more or less easily translated into an institutional form without
significant loss of content. This further suggests that we are on the
right track in giving an account of the public interest.
In the present context I can do no more than briefly set out each
element in the public interest and point to its derivation. The public
interest of a commercial republican regime consists of:
1) The development of a means to prevent law-making from being
captured by those who wish to use the power of the state to serve
unlimited purposes, whether in the service of self-aggrandizement or
(1963); see also Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation and Liberty, supra note 1, at 1-100.
Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944); Charles E. lindbloom, Politics and
Markets, (1977).
51. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 24 (1968).
52. Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics 177 (1993 ed.) (discussing what he
means by "making public decisions 'politically'.").
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in the service of a goal that is said to be of great worth. This is what
Madison called the problem of "faction,"53 and the concern here is to
make it possible for law-makers to attempt to give concrete meaning
to the public interest. This element of the public interest derives from
our commitment to republican government, which is impossible if
faction is not controlled. It is also included in the idea of a free people
capable of self-government.
2) The development of deliberative forms of law-making. This
derives from our commitment to become a self-governing people.
Self-government is valued, in significant part, because it allows a
people to serve their collective purposes. If they are actually to serve
those purposes, they must be able to talk about their specific content
and how to realize them. In short, they must deliberate.
3) The securing of those rights that characterize a commercial
republican people, viz., those that make them a free and equal people
capable of self-government. At the least, these will consist of what
Dahl calls "primary political rights,"' as well as rights that insure that
there will a significant measure of private ownership of productive
assets.
4) The securing of a degree of political equality sufficient to ensure
that the politics of interest aggregation that will be a feature of any
free society, will not be so heavily biased that significant portions of
the citizenry regularly find themselves on the short end of law and
regulation.
5) The securing of a degree of economic equality sufficient to
undergird an equal people capable of self-government. Republican
government requires political equality not only as the basis of an
acceptable form of its aggregative politics, but also because if there is
to be real self-government, then all citizens must have the ability to
participate in it. Political equality requires in turn at least moderate
economic equality." Since we aspire to be a commercial regime, the
principal source of this economic equality must come from a system in
which there is a significant measure of private ownership of
productive property-and this means, more than likely, that it must
come through a wide availability of at least moderately remunerative
work.
6) The development of ways to give those who control productive
assets a degree of discretion in the use of them so that they can use
their detailed knowledge in efficiently deploying these resources -and
to provide these asset-controllers with an array of inducements that
will encourage them to take the risks that are an inevitable feature of

53. The Federalist No. 10, at 53-60 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
54. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy 22 (1985).
55. See id. at 52-83.
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large-scale wealth creation. 56 This is what a commercial regime
requires, and very likely any regime in which high levels of economic
growth are wanted.
7) The development of a vibrant civil society in which private
cooperative undertakings are common, both to serve the interests of
those who participate in these organizations as well as those of some
larger slice of the society. A free people cannot have all of its
important business carried out by the state. Such a state will end up
giving detailed directions to its citizens and will, in the end, be able to
quash all criticism of its actions, since citizens will have no resources
of their own. For much the same reasons, they cannot be selfgoverning either.
These components of the public interest can be restated in an
institutional form, giving us an account of the public interest of a
commercial republic precise enough to guide the efforts of law-makers
involved in giving the public interest concrete meaning. To serve the
public interest means to secure political institutions that control
faction, are significantly deliberative in form, secure rights, and
aggregate interests in a politically equal fashion; it also means to
create and sustain market institutions that create widely available and
at least moderately remunerative work, and that give significant
discretion and inducement to controllers of productive assets; and it
means to create institutions that vil facilitate a vibrant civil society
which makes possible non-governmental forms of cooperation for
large numbers of individuals.
The emphasis in this conception of the public interest is on creating
and maintaining crucial institutions-constitutive institutions that isthe ones that give the regime its characteristic manner of working. In
doing so, serving the public interest helps to bring into being a
political way of life that has at its center a free and equal people
capable of self-government. To serve the public interest of a political
order whose citizens wish for a good regime is to secure and maintain
the institutions that constitute the regime. In the American case, we
who share the aspiration to be a fully realized commercial republic
must want that republic to be the best that it can be, which means
keeping in good repair the institutions that give it its distinctive
character. In the broadest terms, the public interest is that which
makes possible that there will be a commercial republican regime, a
regime whose institutions realize liberal justice. The public interest is
thus both "subjective" and "objective." It derives from the citizenry's
preference for a certain kind of regime whose realization requires a
certain kind of law-making.
It would be odd indeed if something very much like what I have
56. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets 161-233 (1977); Elkin, Market and
Politics in LiberalDemocracy, supra note 27, at 720-32.
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described were not the public interest of a good political regime. If
the regime is a good one, the institutions that give it its character must
also be. To wish for one is to wish for the other. The spirit of this
conception of the public interest is nicely captured by a remark of Neil
MacCormick, who ties this view of the public interest to a "long, spunout thread in Western thought" that "politically ordered societies...
each have a 'common good' not in principle divisible into individual
goods, but a condition of them."57 A more or less fully realized good
political regime is the foundation for the realization of the particular
goods of the individuals that compose such a political community.
IV. LAW-MAKING, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND ECONOMIC
EQUALITY

Now that we have a conception of the public interest of a
commercial republic, we can turn to the question of economic equality
and related matters, including the place of controllers of productive
assets in the political sociology of the regime. To do so, I must first
make clear the relation between constitutional theory as I have been
describing it, and law-making in a more or less fully realized
republican regime. In doing so, I will summarize much of the
preceding discussion.
Since the public interest focuses on the constitutive institutions that
give the regime its character, the task of law-making in the public
interes 8 and the task of constitutional theory mirror one another.
Both are concerned with the realization of these constitutive
institutions. Law-making is the principal means by which the
constitutive
institutions set out in constitutional theory are to be given
59
life.

As I have suggested, the task of constitutional theory is to define
which institutions are constitutive of the regime, how they relate to
one another, how these interrelated institutions are to be supported
by a political sociology-and, on the basis of this analysis, set out an
account of the public interest. In different language, a central task of
constitutional theory is to devise the set of incentives-those that arise
from the design of the constitutive institutions and from the political
sociology of the regime-that will induce law-makers to legislate in
the public interest.' ° In particular, constitutional theory is to concern
57. Neil MacCormick, To 'Ought'from 'Is',Times Literary Supplement, Sept. 11,
1998, at 26.
58. There will be other kinds of law-making, but that cannot be addressed here.

59. Law-making in the public interest is also reflexive since its principal concern
is, among other institutions, to secure the very institutions that are involved in that
law-making.
60. Although there is no room here to pursue the point, since not all law-making
in the commercial republic will need to aim at the public interest, a full theory of
political constitution will need to devise incentives so that whatever other types of
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itself with the problem of what will induce law-makers to consider the
public interest at all, especially in the sort of regime like a commercial
republic where private interest is given so central a place. Beyond
that, constitutional theorists need to consider what will induce lawmakers to consider the particular components that constitutional
theorizing points to as the content of the public interest.
While constitutional theory and law-making in a more or less fully
realized commercial republican regime share a set of concerns, it is,
however, law-makers who must decide the concrete meaning of the
public interest. Even if the public interest could be specified to the
degree sufficient to direct law-makers on how to decide specific cases,
it would be undesirable to do so. This would put government in the
hands of constitutional theorists, and, however attractive this may be
for some who ply this trade,6 most of the rest of us would prefer a
political order where elections play a significantly larger role than
under a reign of theorists. But, in fact, it is not possible for
constitutional theory to set out how the various elements of the public
interest are to be weighted in particular cases. After all, law-making
in a more or less fully realized commercial republic is still law-making
for a specific people with a history, and the virtues and vices that arise
out of the particulars of their historic existence. Such a people inhabit
a particular place and time, unlike the kind of constitutional theory I
have been discussing which can only speak in generalities. Lawmaking in the public interest will, therefore, consist of an effort to
consider the concerns that grow out of the particulars of the society
which call for legislative action, in light of what is called for by the
public interest. Assuming that law-makers are inclined to consider
how to serve the public interest, their task is to give it concrete
meaning by seeking to resolve questions of policy and law in a fashion
that at least does no harm to the public interest, and, if possible,
furthers it. In this they are working to secure the constitutive
institutions that compose the public interest.
In attempting to serve the public interest, it is worth noting that
law-makers will also need to concern themselves with the political
sociology of the regime. The maintenance of particular institutions
inevitably affects the interests of the various strata or classes that
compose the society-and since a commercial republic, like any
regime, rests on a political sociology, law-making in the public interest
cannot be indifferent to such effects. Indeed, it must pay the closest
attention where possible and choose institutional maintenance
strategies that strengthen the kind of political sociology the regime
requires.
law-making are needed will also take place.
61. Consider here those constitutional theorists who do not hesitate to pick up the
mantle of instruction, and who work to reserve all important societal decisions to
judges who then are enjoined to follow the theorists' directions.
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Law-makers at their best then will examine the details of the policy
matter under consideration and consider what the public interest calls
for in the particular instance. Since there will be disagreement about
the precise content of something as important as the public interest, it
is the job of republican law-makers to resolve those disagreements,
insofar as this is possible, in the course of giving the public interest
substance. In giving the public interest concrete meaning, law-makers
will not be free to decide these matters just as they please-not if they
wish to legislate in the service of that public interest.
In describing the interrelations among the institutions that
constitute a commercial republican regime, constitutional theory will
point to the "tensions" or "contradictions" between the institutions
that compose the regime and thus the fault-lines in its public interest.
It will often be the case that the efforts to secure one constitutive
institution will make it more difficult to secure others. Thus,
strengthening the institutions of civil society may pull in the opposite
direction from institutions that are designed to secure rights. The
autonomy that a vibrant associational life requires opens up the
possibility that civil rights may be undercut. Similarly, strengthening
the separation of powers aimed at preventing factional government
may make it harder to maintain political institutions that strengthen
political equality, as the latter may require concentrated legal
authority. Consider here what an effective system of campaign
finance regulation will require. Or, consider in this vein, the
institutions needed to promote the kind of full employment that can
generate the moderate economic equality that, arguably, is needed for
political equality. Law-makers trying to legislate in the public interest
will need to take these contradictions into account. 62
Perhaps the most difficult of such contradictions are the ones that
arise from the need to keep up a steady flow of the kinds of
inducements to asset-controllers that are needed if there are to be
effective market institutions. Such inducements are among the
requirements of keeping in good repair market institutions rooted in
private ownership. In particular, a market system rooted in private
ownership of the means of production is also a system that, by
definition, gives significant discretion to those who control these
productive assets. This means asset-controllers must be induced to
perform the large-scale task of wealth creation. The risks of largescale investment are too great without inducements to reduce them,
and prospective rewards must also be large enough to compensate for
the uncertainty. Moreover, the need to induce means that the views
of asset-controllers on how to operate an enterprise-based market
system will be given the most careful attention by law-makers. This is
62. Not all law-making will confront such tensions or contradictions, but it is
probable that these will be the most important pieces of law and policy since they cut
deep into what constitutes the regime.
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itself one of the inducements to significant investment, and it ensures
that the other inducements offered are of the kind asset-controllers
find attractive.63 Thus, as part of the efforts to secure market
institutions, law-makers must maintain the privileged political access
of asset-controllers.
A central difficulty of law-making in the public interest now comes
into view. In trying to keep in good repair the economic institutions
of the regime, law-makers in a commercial republic will be regularly
tempted, if not to give away the store, at least to work to secure these
institutions in what can perhaps be described as an over-enthusiastic
manner. To serve the public interest, their doors must not only be
open to asset-controllers, but the latter's views, I have said, must be
given weight beyond their number. Law-makers, like most people,
will be inclined to act on the messages they regularly hear, and it is
asset-controllers that they hear more than others. Thus in considering
the design of market institutions and how best to maintain them, and
in weighing the various elements of the public interest, law-makers are
likely to give undue weight to the views of large-scale businessmen.
Otherwise said, law-makers acting in the public interest-which
includes keeping the doors wide open to asset-controllers-will need
to resist mightily the temptations simply to follow asset-controllers'
views of the proper design of a market economy and to undervalue
other aspects of the public interest, i.e., to give too little attention to
those elements of it that are of limited concern to controllers of
capital. If the present American politics are any indication, these
temptations are very real.
Thus, a plausible view of contemporary American political order is
that, instead of moving us closer to a full realization of a commercial
republic, law-making undercuts efforts to do so. The source of the
problem is not only the political privilege that we have just noted,
which is undoubtedly at work. But to it we have added the
Madisonian privilege that the founding design built in: the advantages
conferred on the propertied by an extended republic and large
electoral districts. It should not be surprising then that we have had
considerable difficulty politically in creating a market economy that
regularly produces full employment with at least moderately
remunerative work for all able to participate in the workforce, and in
doing so, promote a moderate kind of economic equality. This is
unlikely to arise only from uncertainty about how to get market
institutions to work in the necessary fashion. There has regularly
been a lack of political will. In large part we have the kind of market
institutions that asset-controllers prefer.
More elaborately, much the same point is true of the weight given
63. Lindblom, supra note 56, at 161-233; Elkin, Market and Politics in Liberal
Democracy, supra note 27, at 720-32.
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by our law-making to strengthening institutions necessary for political
deliberation. Our legislative process has been largely indifferent to,
and sometimes actively hostile to, fostering the public-spirited
citizenry that is needed if we are to have deliberative law-making.
Since much in the politics of a commercial republic will push against
deliberative law-making- attending to particular interests will still be
high on law-makers' agendas-there must be strong countervailing
powers at work. When republican citizens come to think about
political life, they must have some sense that law-makers ought to
display the kind of reasoning about the concrete meaning of the public
interest that only a deliberative way of law-making can provide. In
short, a public-spirited citizenry is needed. From where is this publicspiritedness to come? Only the briefest sketch is possible here."4
Ordinary day-to-day life in a commercial society will not incline very
many people to give any great weight to the public interest. Much
points to attending to their own interests. Thus, if the citizenry is to
have any significant measure of public-spiritedness, there must be
places where its arts can be learned and the value of attending to it
brought home. To judge whether law-makers are themselves acting in
public-spirited ways, citizens must have some experience of trying to
give it concrete meaning. Hence the greatest of social science laws: it
takes one to know one.
Where can this school of citizenship be located? Two of the most
important students of democracy, de Tocqueville and Mill, pointed to
local political life as the only place where the concerns are broad
enough to invite discussion of the public interest and where it is
possible for large numbers of people to take part in such discussions.
However, in a world in which capital is mobile and where local
governments are heavily dependent on the revenues generated
through local taxation, much of local politics will consist of trying to
retain and attract mobile capital. The principal means of doing so is
through rearranging land use; hence the crucial role it plays in local
political life.65 The result is that any sustained discussion of the
broader interests encompassed within the public interest is, at best,
difficult to carry on. Instead of regular deliberation about the
concrete meaning of the public interest, there is complex bargaining
around land use allocation.
Therefore, if there is to be the kind of local political life that will
foster public-spiritedness, some modification must occur in the need
for local governments to attract and keep mobile capital. Virtually all
such efforts will cut across the interests of those who control
productive assets. Consider, for example, how they would respond to
64. For a more complete discussion, see Stephen L. Elkin, Citizen and City:
Locality, Public-Spiritedness and the American Regime, in Dilemmas of Scale in

America's Federal Democracy 37, 37-60 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999).
65. On this question, see Elkin, City and Regime, supra note 30, at 18-101.

2001]

COMMERCIAL REPUBLICAN THEORY

1967

any effort to reduce capital mobility. More importantly, national lawmakers, in fact, have made no such efforts. 66
Our law-making then is badly flawed: we are probably moving
further away from a more or less full realization of a commercial
republic-from the public interest. A legislative agenda aimed at a
full realization of a commercial republic must include in it measures
that: reduce business privilege; reform markets so that they regularly
create full and at least moderately remunerative employment; and
reform local political life so it engenders more public-spiritedness.
Like all significant political changes, this will be a bootstrap operation.
Law-makers and citizens must attempt advances beyond where the
distribution of power and sentiment now points them. They will,
however, only be this adventurous if they have a sense of what is at
stake. It is a central task of constitutional theory to make them aware
that it is the realization of the regime to which they aspire that is at
issue.
CONCLUSION

Do we need the kind of constitutional theory I have outlined here?
It might be argued that such an elaborate theory of political
constitution is surely of no interest given our present contentment.
But even those who feel a flush of pleasure when they contemplate
our present political and economic arrangements need such a theory.
Like those in political orders past and present, they too will have to
face the more or less certain deterioration of our political practices
and institutions. It is doubtful whether any social arrangements can,
unaided, long withstand the forces of inattention, corruption and
conflict. If the legions of the contented are to understand what is
happening to our constitutive institutions and what might be done
about it, they will need a theory of political constitution. Moreover,
even if their contentment reflects the underlying reality, they will still
need such a constitutional theory of the kind I have described, since
there will always be proposals for reform whose results, and perhaps
purpose, will be to undermine the working constitution that is the
object of their sense of satisfaction.
Those who are not content with present institutions and practices,
but are still committed to some version of what we now have, will, of
course, also need a theory of political constitution. For them, it
66. The kind of economic equality that steady and at least modestly remunerative
work will generate will probably not be enough to make a local deliberative politics
possible. Deliberation requires mutual respect-people who do not respect one
another will be unlikely to listen to one another's arguments-and one of the sources
of that respect is a kind of rough economic equality. Thus, to a full employment with
good wages, a commercial republic will almost certainly need to add other equalityproducing measures. Again, this will not be easy given Lindblomian and Madisonian
political privilege.
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provides guidance on how to realize more fully the regime to which
they (and we) aspire. For them the question will be: Are the
problems they see incidental weaknesses of the kind that characterize
any attractive political order? Or are they something of greater
moment? Is the regime in crisis where an all out effort is called for,
where, if action is not taken, the political order will dissolve, probably
into something less attractive? Or, again, are they witnessing the
more or less usual complaining, conflict and mild disarray that are
commonplace in a vibrant democratic political order? To answer such
questions, critics of our present practices need a theory which points
to the remaking of our political institutions in the service of a full
realization of a commercial republic. If they are to do more than
wring their hands or charge off in all directions, chasing after the
panaceas of the moment, they will also need such knowledge.
Whatever else is true then about the constitutional parties that
carry on the debate about the state of our working constitution, they
have, or ought to have, a community of interest in developing the kind
of constitutional theory I have outlined. Not the least of the reasons is
that this theory is the substance of the public interest of the American
commercial republic.

